Agents or Principals? Sub-National Political Leaders in Federal and Unitary Presidential Systems

Presidential systems worldwide could differ in their political decentralisation level and regional units’ policy-making autonomy. Depending on the country, these units may be states (e.g., Nigeria and the US), regions (e.g., Chile), provinces (e.g., Argentina), or districts (e.g., Cyprus). In more decentralised countries, voters elect regional heads of government (e.g., Argentina and Nigeria). In contrast, in others (e.g., Cyprus), the president chooses the local leader or even the head of the regional government appointed by the president must cohabitate with an elected local leader (e.g., Chile). How do these institutional variations affect regional leaders’ behaviour when it comes to career choices? Do they use regional administrations to prove to be loyal agents of the president/party to climb the ladder, or do they try to use them to define their own profile and boost their political career? Do they occupy these positions, such as a consolation prize, when they cannot reach the national level? Do unitary states with appointed leaders provide enough leeway for autonomous moves, or do they strengthen the presidents’ grasp on their party fellows? In contrast, does the direct election of regional chief executives also make them stronger vis-à-vis the president? If only partially, when? This panel looks for papers answering these and other questions, which account for complex power dynamics between central and regional leaders in presidential systems. Special attention is paid to the implications for political careers and the role of regional units in politicians’ prospects. We welcome both theoretical and empirical papers relying on different methods and whose underlying approach is comparative (single-case studies are welcome if they have this approach).