This panel explores variations in support for and enforcement of political finance regulation over the past two decades and contemporary implications. During this time, comparative studies of party finance have made great strides in establishing norms about how to balance public and private money in campaigns and elections. Recent years have shown, however, that well-intentioned reform efforts may fail or be undermine in various ways. Because of the wide range of expenses that relate to campaigns, we can expect parties and candidates to exploit loopholes in regulations, and governments may be slow to close these loopholes, whether due to political conflict or to an unwillingness to harm their own electoral fortunes. Regulations may not be adequately enforced, and inadequate sanctions may encourage parties to ignore campaign finance laws and accept the penalty. Citizens may be unwilling to support existing laws or may subscribe to views of democracy that differ from those of reformers or regulators. This panel draws together studies of European, Asian, Australian, and North American politics in order to determine whether the patterns identified are unavoidable aspects of any system of regulation, or whether they are consequences of political polarization or the rise of anti-system, populist politics in democratic systems.
Type
Closed Panel
Language
English
Chair
Discussants
Description
Onsite Presentation Language
Same as proposal language
Panel ID
PL-7769