International Security Cooperation and Conflict in the Modern World: Domestic, Psychological, and Systemic Drivers

This panel consists of six papers presenting cutting-edge research on the domestic, psychological, and systemic factors driving international security cooperation and conflict in today's world, using a broad range of approaches, from formal theory and survey experiments to case studies and statistical analysis. The first three papers focus on domestic sources of international security cooperation and conflict. The first one employs formal theory and shows that, under certain conditions, populist leaders in economically powerful countries can significantly increase the risk of interstate war. The second paper uses survey experiments to investigate the relationship between allies’ defense spending and US public support for military intervention, revealing that increased military capabilities among allies (i.e., more burden-sharing) can paradoxically reduce the American public's backing for intervention in support of those allies. The third paper explores the effect of US-security assistance on the "liberal behavior" (i.e., respect for human rights and civilian authority) of the militaries receiving assistance. Statistical analysis indicates that this effect is conditional on regime type, as security assistance contributes to more liberal behavior by the militaries of democratic countries, with either no effect or a negative effect for autocracies. The fourth and fifth papers examine psychological drivers of international conflict. The fourth one leverages survey evidence about a hypothetical Sino-Korean crisis to challenge conventional understandings of resolve, showing that Korean respondents with negative views of China are more likely to perceive it as resolved and favor a tougher stance by Seoul in the crisis. The fifth paper applies the psychological thesis of myopic self-focus in the balance of power calculus to Russia's decision to invade Ukraine in 2022. Using a case study, it shows that Moscow followed preventive war logic but opted for invasion primarily based on when its absolute power peaked, following the completion of its military modernization program, rather than adequately considering Ukraine's growing capabilities. The sixth paper focuses on the systemic level, theorizing about the implications for great power competition of rising regional peer hegemons outside the Western Hemisphere, particularly in East Asia.