Institutional change in anti-corruption policies

Corruption is arguably a factor of “bad” governance, for it hinders public spending and fair competition, besides fostering social inequality and threatening democracy worldwide. Its intrinsic effects add up to more contingent ones, like the quality of bureaucracy, the rule of law or the level of development. It may take many forms, including bribing, extortion, exchange of favors, nepotism, cronyism, embezzlement, kleptocracy, influence peddling, conflicts of interest and multiple ways of fraud (judicial, accounting, electoral, public service).
It has gone through significant changes in nature, scope and predictability for the past four decades. In particular, it has become a major issue with the rise of global transactions and the emergence of transnational networks of organized crime. Hence the new challenges to governments’ capacity, raised by the design of effective policies to control corruption. ICT innovation and markets deregulation are the main driving forces of these transformations. But they are not the only ones. A major contemporary policy issue is the spreading out of organized crime worldwide, which stems from the expansion of drug trafficking, the intensification of human mobility and human trafficking —that is often related to massive emigration—, the longstanding implantation of terrorist organizations in failed states, and the worldwide expansion of arm trafficking, fueled by civil conflicts.
Furthermore, no government or international organization has been able to counteract the pervasive interplays of organized crime with authoritarian regimes and new democracies, so that countries currently enjoying highly consolidated democratic regimes appear as citadels under siege, where governments fail to control corruption on their own territories. Money laundering is actually a significant part of the economic development in these countries, including the most industrialized ones, that undermines many sectors like banking, construction, services and entertainment industries.
We invite scholars to discuss these issues from an institutional perspective. We are particularly interested in empirical works that advance the questions regarding the relationship between institutional change and corruption control. Concept papers are also welcome, as long as they are empirically grounded. We also look forward to learning from comparative studies, drawing either on large-N or small-N methods.