The most prominent development in the study of democratic survival or breakdown, perhaps since the end of the Cold War, is the understanding that the subversion of democracy can take place by elected incumbents. Paradoxically, free, fair and competitive elections of extreme-right and extreme-left populists have generated lots of distress not only in new but also in well-stablished and consolidated democracies around the world.
A common approach in the growing backsliding literature tends to see institutions and society as fundamentally defenseless and, above all, helpless victims of elected populists. So, once in power, populists would almost always unilaterally weaken the liberal components of a democracy. However, not all elected populist autocrats succeed in their attempts to backslide democracy. In fact, many have failed and democratic politics has returned to business as usual.
Why do some populist leaders gain extraordinary prominence and succeed asphyxiating democracy but not others? What are the historical paths and the institutional and political conditions that either facilitate or create obstacles for populists to make democracy fragile or resilient? What are the antidotes against populism’s illiberal and antidemocratic initiatives?