Regulation and Populism in Latin America: Crisis of the Regulatory Model

Over the past decades, regulatory independence has become a fundamental principle and a global norm of good governance in economic regulation. Agencies such as energy and telecommunications regulators and competition authorities are expected to operate independently from politics and electoral considerations to achieve the best policy outcomes for consumers and the economy. However, in recent years, economic regulators have faced increasing political pressure and intervention, especially under populist governments. While the impact of populist pressures on central bank independence has been extensively studied (e.g., Binder 2021; Gavin & Manger 2023; Goodhart & Lastra 2018; Meyer 2020), we do not know how similar pressures have affected economic regulation, although anecdotal evidence suggests it has also resulted in reduced independence. This panel aims to gather recent research and evidence on the interaction between regulatory bodies and populist governments in Latin America